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Abstract 28 
Objective: This research investigates the potential behavioral and performance benefits of 29 
a 4-stage likelihood alarm system (4-LAS) contrasting a 3-LAS, a binary alarm system with 30 
a liberal threshold (lib-BAS) and a BAS with a conservative threshold (con-BAS). 31 
Background: Prior research has shown performance benefits of 3-LASs over conventional 32 
lib-BASs due to more distinct response strategies and better discriminating true from false 33 
alerts. This effect might be further enhanced using 4-LASs. However, the increase of stages 34 
could cause users to reduce cognitive complexity by responding in the same way to the two 35 
lower and the two higher stages, thus treating the 4-LAS like a con-BAS. 36 
Method: All systems were compared using a dual task paradigm. Response strategies, 37 
number of joint human machine (JHM) false alarms (FAs), misses, and sensitivity were 38 
regarded. 39 
Results: Compared to the lib-BAS, JHM sensitivity only improved with the 4-LAS and the 40 
con-BAS. However, the number of JHM misses was lowest for the con-BAS compared to 41 
all other systems. 42 
Conclusion: JHM sensitivity improvements can be achieved by using a 4-LAS, as well as 43 
a con-BAS. However, only the latter one may also reduce the number of JHM misses, which 44 
is remarkable considering that BASs with conservative thresholds a priori commit more 45 
inbuilt misses than other systems. 46 
Application: Results suggest implementing conservative BASs in multi-task working 47 
environments to improve JHM sensitivity and reduce the number of JHM misses. When 48 
refraining from designing systems which are miss prone, 4-LASs represent a suitable 49 
compromise. 50 
Key Words: warning, threshold setting, decision-making, signal detection theory, 51 
automation 52 
Précis: Using a multi-task paradigm, we compared the behavioral and performance 53 
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consequences of a four-stage likelihood alarm system (4-LAS) to a 3-LAS and two binary 54 
alarm systems (BASs), one with a liberal and one with a conservative threshold and found 55 
the conservative BAS to lead to the best performance and behavior. 56 
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In many safety critical domains, such as aviation or process industry, operators must carry 57 
out supervisory tasks, including monitoring the time dynamics of processes or monitoring 58 
of parameters (e.g., temperature or pressure), in order to evaluate the current state of the 59 
system as nominal or critical. Frequently, these tasks must be performed concurrently with 60 
other tasks (e.g., manual operations, communication with others). However, in case of a 61 
critical event, requiring intervention under time pressure by the operator, the supervisory 62 
task must immediately be prioritized over the other tasks. Automated monitoring systems 63 
with integrated alarm or warning functionalities often assist the operator in their priority 64 
setting by guiding their attention to critical events and supporting their decision-making. 65 
Alarms emitted by these systems usually provide the most salient and only cue for an 66 
operator to decide upon a proper action. This applies to all sorts of remote monitoring 67 
devices implemented, for example, in intensive care units of hospitals, in centralized control 68 
rooms, or in aircraft cockpits. In these settings, monitoring devices usually provide alarms 69 
indicating critical states without the operator being able to cross-check the alarm validity 70 
towards other directly available information. 71 
Currently, most of such alarm systems are binary alarm systems (BASs) that remain silent 72 
(e.g., show a green light) as long as all data assessed suggest a nominal operation and emit 73 
an alarm (e.g., show a red light) as soon as deviations from nominal operation are detected. 74 
Due to imperfect reliability caused by inherent technical constraints and ambiguous (noisy) 75 
data, the alarm systems can err. These errors can either be false alarms (FAs), defined as 76 
alarms generated without an underlying critical event, or misses, i.e., no alarm is generated 77 
in the presence of a critical event. These errors are not independent of each other but 78 
inevitably linked through the choice of threshold setting for the emittance of alarms. 79 
Specifically, if low (liberal) threshold settings are used and alarms are already emitted in 80 
response to weak deviations of the nominal state, the number of misses is kept low but only 81 
at the expense of a considerable number of FAs. The opposite holds true for choosing higher 82 
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(more conservative) threshold settings. 83 
In most safety critical domains, designers of BASs prefer to use liberal thresholds, i.e., they 84 
prefer false-alarm prone systems over miss prone systems. This reflects the commonly 85 
applied fail-safe engineering approach (Swets, 1992; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 86 
However, experiencing many FAs can reduce operators’ trust in the alarm system (Lee & 87 
See, 2004; Madhavan, Wiegmann, & Lacson, 2006). As a consequence, their response time 88 
to alarms can increase (e.g., Getty, Swets, Pickett, & Gonthier, 1995; Wickens & Colombe, 89 
2007), or they may even completely ignore given alarms (e.g., Bliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 90 
1995; Lees & Lee, 2007; Meyer, Bitan, Shinar, & Zmora, 1999). This effect has been 91 
referred to as ‘cry wolf’ phenomenon (Breznitz, 1984) which is related to the problem of 92 
alarm fatigue (Graham & Cvach, 2010; Sendelbach; 2013) and can compromise safety by 93 
specifically enhancing the risk of missing a critical event. Goel, Datta and Mannan (2017) 94 
have provided a recent review of incidents caused by such inappropriate alarm responses. 95 
The current research investigates to what extent an improvement of adequate responding to 96 
alarms can be achieved by providing operators with more complex Likelihood Alarm 97 
Systems (LAS; Sorkin, Kantowitz, & Kantowitz, 1988). LASs do not only inform users 98 
about the absence and presence of a critical event, but also provide a sort of staged 99 
information about the relative likelihood that the emitted alert is actually true. 100 
BACKGROUND: RESPONDING TO ALARMS 101 
Alarm systems should support operators in detecting critical events. This implies that 102 
operators are expected to adjust their behavior according to the alarm systems’ outputs. 103 
Specifically, they are expected to continue with their tasks and refrain from any action if 104 
the alarm system remains silent but need to initiate immediate proper action when an alarm 105 
is emitted. According to Meyer (2001), the former behavior is referred to as reliance and 106 
the latter as compliance. However, operators do not always behave as intended. For 107 
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example, the cry wolf effect mentioned above reflects a clear lack of compliance, based on 108 
the repeated experience of FAs. Since in most of the cases operators do not know the exact 109 
threshold setting of their alarm systems, their decision whether or not to respond to alarms 110 
is usually based on the perceived alarm reliability, which has been referred to as the positive 111 
predictive value of an alarm system (PPV; Getty et al., 1995). Formally defined, the PPV is 112 
the conditional probability of a critical event, given an alarm is emitted. It is calculated by 113 
dividing the number of hits by the total number of alarms (i.e., hits plus FAs). The 114 
corresponding characteristic of the non-alert stage is the negative predictive value (NPV), 115 
defined as the number of correct rejections (CRs) divided by the number of non-alert events 116 
(i.e., CRs plus misses; Meyer & Bitan, 2002). 117 
Consistent findings over the past twenty years have shown that response frequencies to 118 
alarms decrease with decreasing PPV (e.g., Bliss et al., 1995; Bustamante, Bliss, & 119 
Anderson, 2007; McCarley, Rubinstein, Steelman, & Swanson, 2011; Manzey, Gèrard, & 120 
Wiczorek, 2014). More specifically, response behavior in interaction with alarms often 121 
mirrors one of two different strategies: probability matching or extreme responding (Bliss, 122 
2003). Probability matching represents a sort of response heuristic in which operators try to 123 
adjust their response rates to the PPV, with lower PPVs leading to successively lower and 124 
higher PPVs leading to successively higher response rates. In contrast, extreme responding 125 
mirrors an all-or-nothing strategy, leading to either ignoring most alarms (negative extreme 126 
responding) or to responding to most alarms (positive extreme responding). While 127 
probability matching has been found to be the dominant strategy for medium PPVs, negative 128 
and positive extreme responding often are applied in response to alarms with low and high 129 
PPVs, respectively (e.g., Bliss, 2003). For example, in the study of Manzey et al. (2014, 130 
Exp. 1) the portion of participants who preferred positive extreme responding over 131 
probability matching increased from 8% to 90% with the PPV increasing from .5 to .9. In 132 
contrast, incidents of negative extreme responding, indicating a cry wolf effect, increased 133 
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considerably for PPVs lower than .4. In most domains where alarms systems are 134 
implemented the base rate of critical events is usually low. Consequently, even highly 135 
sensitive BASs become false-alarm prone to a considerably high degree – with PPVs of 136 
BASs frequently less than .3 (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Parasuraman, Hancock, & 137 
Olofinboba, 1997). In this case, both strategies mentioned above would directly lead to a 138 
high rate of ignored alarms during the interaction with BASs. One possible countermeasure 139 
to prevent or at least mitigate such an effect is the use of LASs. By providing various alerts 140 
with different PPVs, LASs provide more options than BASs to guide users’ behavior. Thus, 141 
they enable operators to better distinguish between true and false alerts than BASs and to 142 
adapt their behavior accordingly. However, the full potential of LASs has not yet been 143 
investigated in its entirety. 144 
LIKELIHOOD ALARM SYSTEMS 145 
The basic concept of LASs has already been suggested thirty years ago as an alternative to 146 
BASs by Sorkin et al. (1988). In contrast to BASs, LASs have more than one threshold for 147 
emitting various alerts, which then differ in their PPV and therefore inform the operator 148 
about the relative likelihood of an underlying critical event. Compared to control conditions 149 
with classical BASs, LASs were found to improve decision-making and performance in 150 
terms of accuracy (e.g., Clark, Peyton, & Bustamante, 2009; Ragsdale, Dyre, & Boring, 151 
2012; Wiczorek & Manzey, 2014), particularly under high-workload conditions and for low 152 
base rates (Bustamante 2005, 2008; Clark & Bustamante, 2008). Moreover, it has been 153 
shown that LASs are especially useful to improve proper responding to alerts in case that 154 
the validity of an alert cannot be easily verified towards other available information 155 
(Wiczorek & Manzey, 2014). Only a few studies did not find benefits of LASs over BASs 156 
(e.g., Wickens & Colombe, 2007). 157 
The common procedure of designing a LAS is keeping the initial low threshold of a typical 158 
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liberal BAS, which separates non-alerts from alerts, but grading the alert level further by 159 
adding (at least) one additional threshold (Bustamante 2005, 2008; Clark & Bustamante 160 
2008; Clark et al., 2009; Clark, Ingebritsen, & Bustamante, 2010; Ragsdale et al., 2012; 161 
Vargas & Bustamante 2011; Wiczorek, 2017; Wiczorek & Manzey, 2014, Wiczorek, 162 
Manzey, & Zirk, 2014). 163 
 164 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of a three-stage LAS. 165 
Most common are LASs with two thresholds which consist of three stages (3-LAS) as 166 
depicted in Figure 1. Parameters above the first (original) and below the second threshold 167 
trigger a warning (i.e., relatively low PPV) and parameters exceeding the second threshold 168 
trigger an alarm (i.e., relatively high PPV). Such systems have been found to improve 169 
operators’ decision-making by increasing responses to true alerts and, at the same time, 170 
reducing responses to FAs. Specifically, participants interacting with a 3-LAS were found 171 
to apply probability matching to warnings, but to choose positive extreme responding in 172 
response to alarms when they do not have the chance to validate the alarm system’s 173 
diagnoses (Wiczorek, 2017; Wiczorek & Manzey, 2014). Thus, for 3-LASs, the cry wolf 174 
effect is still visible to some extent but almost exclusively in interaction with warnings, 175 
which have a lower likelihood to truly indicate a critical event anyway.  176 
Based on these findings, the question arises whether this benefit of 3-LASs could be further 177 
enhanced by an even more graduated 4-LAS. Adding a fourth stage by separating the former 178 
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3-LAS warning stage into higher-PPV and lower-PPV warnings could shift the cry wolf 179 
effect further to the lower-PPV warnings of the 4-LAS. Due to their lower likelihood to 180 
truly indicate a critical event, ignoring them is less likely to result in missing a critical event 181 
(compared to the 3-LAS warnings). This in turn could cause performance improvements 182 
from the 3-LAS to the 4-LAS. However, an obvious trade-off that must be considered is 183 
one between the benefits of more distinct information and the disadvantages of a higher 184 
complexity for operators to adjust response behavior to the different sort of alerts. Thus, it 185 
remains to be seen whether a four-stage LAS (4-LAS) really enhances its value beyond that 186 
of a 3-LAS or leads operators to reduce the raised complexity, for example, by responding 187 
in the same way to the two lower and higher stages, respectively. In the latter case, the more 188 
distinct information provided by the 4-LAS would not be used and the whole system would 189 
be treated like a 3-LAS or even a BAS with a relatively conservative threshold. 190 
Thus far, only few studies have investigated the performance consequences of LASs with 191 
more than three stages. For example, already in their classical work, Sorkin et al. (1988) 192 
contrasted a 4-LAS with a conventional BAS. However, they created the fourth stage by 193 
further separating the non-alert stage into lower-NPV and higher-NPV non-alerts. 194 
Consequently, the alarm stage and the warning stage corresponded to those known from 195 
most 3-LASs. 196 
St. John and Manes (2002) went even further and investigated the performance 197 
consequences of a six-stage alerting system that supported participants in a visual search 198 
task. Participants had the option to validate the system’s diagnoses by rolling over a location 199 
with the mouse and to hold for one second to get a clearer view on the target. They found 200 
that the six-stage alerting system led to a better performance than a BAS. However, given 201 
that the authors did not compare the six-stage alerting system with a simpler 3-LAS, it 202 
remains unclear whether the benefits were linked to the six stages or resulted from a more 203 
general effect of graduated alerts at all. In a study directly contrasting different types of 204 
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LASs, Shurtleff (1991) compared three different LASs consisting of four, six, and eight 205 
stages to a BAS. Participants were provided with different polygons which they had to 206 
identify as friends or foes while being supported by one of the alarm systems. Shurtleff 207 
(1991) found significant performance improvements for the 4-LAS and the 8-LAS 208 
compared to the BAS in a target detection task, but not between any of the LASs. Moreover, 209 
again the three complex LASs were not contrasted with a basic 3-LAS and therefore no 210 
clear conclusion can be drawn whether the performance benefits of the LASs were due to 211 
the number of stages > 3 or just the graduation of alert levels in general.  212 
CURRENT RESEARCH 213 
The current research compares the behavioral effects and performance consequences of a 214 
four-stage LAS (4-LAS) with a three-stage LAS (3-LAS) and two sorts of BAS, the latter 215 
differing in whether they had a conventional liberal threshold (lib-BAS) or a more 216 
conservative (con-BAS) threshold for emitting alarms. All alarm systems were modeled 217 
based on the signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966). They consisted of the 218 
same good but not perfect sensitivity d’ = 1.7. The base rate of critical events was set to p 219 
= .3 in every condition. These parameters were chosen to allow the comparison with prior 220 
studies including LASs using similar sensitivities and base rates of d’ = 1.8 and p = .3, 221 
respectively (Wiczorek & Manzey, 2014; Wiczorek, Balaud & Manzey, 2015, Wiczorek 222 
2017). Choosing such a relatively high base rate reflects a compromise between simulating 223 
a realistic situation which often is characterized by much lower base rates of critical events 224 
and the necessity to elicit enough events for a reliable behavior assessment in a time limited 225 
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testing session. Threshold settings and resulting NPVs and PPVs are displayed in Figure 2. 226 
 227 
Figure 2. Thresholds and resulting NPVs and PPVs for the four alarm systems used in this study. 228 
The two LASs and the lib-BAS shared the same (first) threshold, separating the non-alert 229 
(green) from the alert stage (red). Thus, the overall alert-PPV for these three systems 230 
was .43. The 3-LAS had a second threshold, separating the alert stage in an alarm stage 231 
(red) with an alarm-PPV of .88 and a warning stage (yellow) with a warning-PPV of .29. 232 
For the 4-LAS, this warning stage was further separated by a third threshold, resulting in a 233 
PPV of .5 for the higher-PPV warning stage (amber) and .18 for the lower-PPV warning 234 
stage (yellow). 235 
In the case of the lib-BAS, probability matching was expected to be the dominant strategy 236 
in the alarm stage, resulting in a considerable number of ignored alarms and perhaps missed 237 
critical events. For both LASs, however, positive extreme responding was expected to be 238 
the dominant response pattern to alarms due to their high PPV. This should lead to more 239 
correct responses to true critical events (“hits”) compared to the lib-BAS. The other alert 240 
stages of the two LASs were expected to guide behavior in a distinct way, related to the 241 
different PPVs with an even better informational basis of proper differentiation between 242 
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true and false alerts provided by the 4-LAS compared to the 3-LAS. However, instead of 243 
applying different strategies to the different alert levels of the 4-LAS, participants could 244 
also reduce the complexity by mentally transforming the 4-LAS into a three-stage or a two-245 
stage system by ignoring one or two of the thresholds. The latter option would then 246 
correspond to a sort of mental dichotomization in which the two lower and higher stages 247 
would be integrated into one stage, respectively. The resulting mental representation would 248 
correspond to a BAS with a more conservative threshold. To investigate this possibility, the 249 
con-BAS was included as a fourth alarm system in the current research. The con-BAS’s 250 
only threshold corresponded to the middle threshold of the 4-LAS (separating lower- and 251 
higher-PPV warnings) resulting in an alarm-PPV of .69 for the con-BAS. 252 
METHOD 253 
Participants 254 
Based on a power analysis and the assumption of a large effect (η² = .14), 60 (28 male, 32 255 
female) students were recruited to participate in the study. Their age ranged from 20 to 47 256 
years (M = 26.27; SD = 4.43). They were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 257 
This research complied with the tenets of the Declaration of Helsinki. Informed consent 258 
was obtained from each participant. For their participation, they received a basic 259 
compensation of either €10 or ECTS credits, complemented by an additional reward of up 260 
to €8, depending on their performance. 261 
Task environment 262 
The PC-based multi-task operator performance simulation (M-TOPS, Manzey et al., 2014) 263 
was used as simulation environment. It represents a dual-task environment requiring 264 
concurrent performance of a quality control task and a cognitive task simulating basic 265 
operational demands of control room operators. Participants were instructed to keep the 266 
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process of the plant running. For this, two tasks had to be executed: the resource ordering 267 
task (Figure 3, upper left side) and the alert task (Figure 3, bottom right side). 268 
Figure 3. M-TOPS interface with resource ordering task in the upper left side and alarm task with a 269 
4-LAS, indicating a high-likelihood warning, on the bottom right side. 270 
 271 
Resource ordering task: Participants are instructed to order chemicals that are needed to 272 
maintain the chemical process. In the upper left of the screen, participants see the actual 273 
amount and the demand of one chemical at a time. Their task is to calculate the difference 274 
(i.e., the required amount), to enter it into the referring field, and to send the order by 275 
clicking the ‘order’ button. After clicking the button, a new task appears. Every ordering 276 
task is displayed for a maximum duration of 15 seconds. Participants’ responses are logged 277 
automatically. 278 
Alert task: Participants are told they are responsible for controlling the quality (i.e., the 279 
molecular weight) of the chemical end product. In this task, participants are supported by 280 
one of the four alarm systems. They are told that the plant has a control station that checks 281 
the containers filled with the chemical product automatically. Every six seconds a new 282 
container enters the control station. For each container, a diagnosis is given by the automatic 283 
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control system. When the chemical product meets the quality standards (appropriate 284 
molecular weight), the alarm system shows a green light. When the quality of the chemical 285 
product is not adequate, the alarm system sends off an alert. Each diagnosis is accompanied 286 
by a notification as depicted in Figure 4 below. Participants do not receive any alarm validity 287 
information. 288 
 The molecular weight is … 
lib-BAS ok 
(green light) 
too high 
(red light) 
3-LAS ok 
(green light) 
potentially too high 
(yellow light) 
too high 
(red light) 
4-LAS ok 
(green light) 
potentially too high 
(yellow light) 
probably too high 
(amber light) 
too high 
(red light) 
con-BAS kk 
(green light) 
too high 
(red light) 
Figure 4. Notifications and colors of the different stages of the four alarm systems. 289 
Containers obtaining a chemical product not meeting the quality standards can be repaired 290 
by the participant when clicking the ‘repair’ button within six seconds. Containers that meet 291 
the criteria leave the control station automatically after six seconds and no action of the 292 
participant is required. Participants’ responses are logged automatically. 293 
Payoff 294 
Participants received 1.5 points for every correct order in the resource ordering task. For 295 
every wrong decision in the alert task, they lost 2 points. This procedure was chosen to 296 
create a competitive situation between both tasks and to ensure that they were considered 297 
as equally important by the participants. For each point participants received 2.5 Euro cents. 298 
Dependent measures 299 
Behavior 300 
Response strategies were analyzed for each person and system stage individually based on 301 
previous research (Manzey et al., 2014). Response rates of 90% and above were classified 302 
as positive extreme responding, response rates of 10% and lower were classified as negative 303 
extreme responding. All individual response rates in between were regarded as probability 304 
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matching. 305 
Performance 306 
The following measures served as performance indicators of the alert task, reflecting the 307 
overall performance of the joint human machine (JHM) system:  308 
(1) number of FAs committed by a participant when supported by a given system, 309 
(defined as the number of clicking the repair button when the container was ok),  310 
(2) number of misses committed by a participant when supported by a given system,  311 
defined as the number of missing responses when an action was needed (i.e., when the 312 
molecular weight was too high), 313 
(3) overall sensitivity of the JHM system corresponding to the d’ parameter of the SDT, 314 
defined as d‘= z[p(JHM hit)] – z[p(JHM FA)], with p(JHM hit) = JHM hits / (JHM hits 315 
+ JHM misses) and p(JHM FA) = JHM FAs / (JHM FAs + JHM CRs). 316 
In order to assess the performance in the resource ordering task, the total number of 317 
correct responses was recorded.  318 
Procedure 319 
The experiment took place at Technische Universität Berlin in groups of up to four people. 320 
After signing consent forms and filling in demographic questionnaires, participants 321 
navigated through the instruction presentation. They were told they would be operating an 322 
industrial plant and were responsible for two tasks – alert task and resource ordering task – 323 
which are both equally important and that a reliable but not error-free alarm system would 324 
support them executing the alert task. Subsequently, they practiced both tasks as single tasks 325 
and in parallel, two minutes each. The alarm system was running during practice sessions 326 
(except when practicing the resource ordering task as single task). 327 
After this instruction and practice part, participants conducted a 100-trial alert task block to 328 
become familiar with the characteristics of the referring alarm system. During this block 329 
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feedback was provided after each trial by an acoustical signal informing participants about 330 
committing a wrong decision (i.e., clicking the ‘repair’ button when the container was intact 331 
or not clicking the button when the container was faulty). After this block, participants were 332 
informed about the actual system characteristics (NPV and PPV(s)) by showing them the 333 
absolute number of correct and wrong diagnoses made by the referring alarm system in 334 
order to avoid any biases related to only experience-based vs. description-based information 335 
(Hertwig & Erev, 2009). The following experimental block then included a total of 100 336 
trials of the alert task which had to be performed concurrently with the resource ordering 337 
task. No feedback was provided during this block. The whole experimental session lasted 338 
two hours. At the end of the session the participants were paid and debriefed. 339 
RESULTS 340 
Individual response strategies were only regarded descriptively. The different performance 341 
measures (d’, number of FAs and misses) of the alert task were analyzed using the non-342 
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test (Kruskal & Wallis, 1952). This test was chosen due to a 343 
violated variance homogeneity. Additional pairwise post-hoc contrasts of performances in 344 
the different conditions were performed by non-parametric Dunn’s test (Dunn, 1961). Since 345 
the shape of the distributions of the four groups differed, the Kruskal-Wallis test contrasted 346 
the mean ranks of the four groups, which are reported along with the statistical results in 347 
the text. Note that small ranks correspond to small variable values. However, for allowing 348 
a comprehensive descriptive comparison, medians are depicted in the figures. Performance 349 
in the resource ordering task was analyzed using a one-way ANOVA. All analyses were 350 
performed with the IBM SPSS Statistics 25 package. Because of missing data, only 59 of 351 
the 60 participants were included in the statistical analysis. 352 
Response strategies in interaction with alerts 353 
The response strategies to the different stages differed considerably. Most of the participants 354 
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working with the lib-BAS applied probability matching in response to alarms while most 355 
of the participants working with one of the two LASs responded to almost all the emitted 356 
alarms, i.e., they applied positive extreme responding. The users’ main strategy of 357 
responding to warnings emitted by the 3-LAS was probability matching. Participants of the 358 
4-LAS showed a distinct pattern of strategies when responding to the two types of warnings, 359 
which was more extreme than expected. With the higher-PPV warnings at least half of the 360 
participants applied the positive extreme responding heuristic while the dominant strategy 361 
for the lower-PPV warnings was negative extreme responding. Finally, the con-BAS system 362 
only triggered extreme response strategies, with negative extreme responding to non-alerts 363 
and positive extreme responding to alarms. 364 
Figure 5. Response strategies applied for all diagnoses of the four alarm systems. 365 
Alert task performance 366 
The distributions of the number of misses and FAs for all four alarm systems are depicted 367 
in Figure 6. While the differences between the number of FAs committed by the participants 368 
when working with the different systems just failed the conventional level of statistical 369 
significance, χ²(3, N = 59) = 7.468; p = .058, η² = .13, a significant effect for alarm system 370 
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was found for misses, χ²(3, N = 59) = 19.587; p < .001, η² = .34. The number of misses was 371 
lowest when the participants were supported by the con-BAS (mean rank across individuals: 372 
14), followed by the 4-LAS (31.6) and both, the lib-BAS (34.7) and the 3-LAS (39.9). 373 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons based on the Dunn’s test revealed the 374 
differences between the con-BAS and all other systems as significant (all p < .04). 375 
376 
Figure 6. Median, quartiles, minimum and maximum of the number of JHM misses and FAs for the 377 
four alarm systems. 378 
 379 
Figure 7 shows the d’ distributions for the four alarm systems. In line with our expectations, 380 
d’ was higher when the participants were supported by one of the two LASs (3-LAS: mean 381 
rank = 23; 4-LAS: 31.8) compared to the lib-BAS (13.7). However, the highest d’ was found 382 
for the con-BAS (51.6). Statistically, this was confirmed by a significant main effect for 383 
alarm system, χ²(3, N = 59) = 40.376; p < .001, η² = .70. 384 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons based on Dunn’s test revealed significant 385 
differences between the con-BAS and all other systems (all p < .02), and between the 4-386 
LAS and the lib-BAS, p = .026. No significant differences emerged between the lib-BAS 387 
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and the 3-LAS, as well as between the two LASs. 388 
Figure 7. Median, quartiles, minimum and maximum of the JHM d’ for the four alarm systems. 389 
Concurrent task performance 390 
No significant differences between the four alarm systems emerged regarding the 391 
performance in the resource ordering task, F (3, 55) = .13; p = 945, η² = .01. 392 
DISCUSSION 393 
The current study aimed to investigate the possible benefits of LASs compared to BASs in 394 
a situation where the emitted alerts represented the only cue to decide whether to intervene 395 
in an automated process. For this purpose, we compared the behavioral and performance 396 
consequences of two LASs of different complexity (3-LAS; 4-LAS) and a conventional 397 
BAS with a relatively liberal threshold setting. In addition, a con-BAS with a conservative 398 
threshold was included as control condition to investigate possible strategies of complexity 399 
reduction of 4-LAS users.  400 
Surprisingly, the con-BAS yielded the best performance in terms of a significantly improved 401 
JHM sensitivity. This superiority was partly related to the (descriptively) lowest number of 402 
FAs, but mainly due to the lower number of misses compared to all other systems. The latter 403 
finding is particularly interesting because the con-BAS had the highest a priori probability 404 
by design to commit misses (due to the low NPV resulting from the conservative threshold 405 
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setting). The analysis of response strategies suggests that participant’s high compliance 406 
rates to alarms and, thus, the absence of any cry wolf effect, were sufficient to more than 407 
compensate for the inbuilt misses of the con-BAS. This result was not expected but might 408 
explain previous findings suggesting that humans prefer more conservative thresholds in 409 
BASs when they have a choice (Bustamante et al., 2007; Merkel & Wiczorek, 2012). 410 
With respect to the behavioral consequences of the 3-LAS, this study confirms the results 411 
of previous research by Wiczorek and Manzey (2014). As expected, alarms and warnings 412 
induced different response strategies, with positive extreme responding and probability 413 
matching being the dominant strategies, respectively. However, in contrast to previous 414 
findings (e.g., Bustamante, 2005; Bustamante 2008), the effects of performance 415 
improvements over the lib-BAS in terms of reduced FAs, reduced misses, and an increased 416 
d’ were not strong enough to reach significance. A clearer (significant) advantage of 417 
providing graduated alerts compared to the lib-BAS was achieved when participants were 418 
supported by the 4-LAS. This is in line with other results of our lab (based on data collected 419 
shortly after the one of the present study), which even showed a significantly improved 420 
performance of the 4-LAS compared to the 3-LAS with only slightly different threshold 421 
settings (Balaud & Manzey, 2014). 422 
The analyses of response strategies revealed that the performance advantage of the 4-LAS 423 
over the lib-BAS was not due to participants using the more graduated information for a 424 
more complex differentiation in responding to the different types of alerts. Actually, ten out 425 
of 14 participants in the 4-LAS condition ignored most of the lower-PPV warnings (i.e., 426 
committed a negative extreme responding strategy to this type of alerts) and treated them 427 
the same as the non-alerts. For the higher-PPV warnings, half of the participants showed 428 
positive responding (i.e., they did not make a difference between the higher-PPV warning 429 
stage and the alarm stage). Thus, it seems that providing more graduated information with 430 
a 4-LAS caused at least a considerable portion of participants to respond in a way that 431 
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reduces the complexity of the system to a sort of BAS with a conservative threshold. This 432 
suggests that the 4-LAS induced behavioral strategies like the con-BAS and, thus, might 433 
also be effective in countering the cry wolf effect, albeit not as much as the con-BAS. 434 
Implications 435 
The con-BAS appeared to be the most effective system in terms of not only preventing a 436 
cry wolf effect in response to alarms, but also in keeping the number of misses low, resulting 437 
in the overall best joint human machine sensitivity. Thus, the implication of this research 438 
seems to be quite simple: there is no need for additional alert stages in alarm systems. 439 
Instead, thresholds in BASs should be set more conservatively. At least this seems to hold 440 
true in situations where the cry wolf effect cannot be prevented by other interventions (e.g., 441 
availability of alarm verification information; Manzey et al., 2014). 442 
However, from a practitioner’s perspective there is a flip side of using conservative BASs. 443 
Even though the number of joint human machine misses might be reduced tremendously, 444 
implementing a con-BAS would mean to provide a miss prone system. This would directly 445 
contradict the common fail-safe engineering approach, and there are only few contexts 446 
conceivable where this might be different. One is the medical domain where critical events 447 
tend to evolve over time. Here, more conservative thresholds would only introduce a 448 
delayed response but don’t seem to increase the occurrence of missed events. Thus, the 449 
introduction of a con-BAS would not necessarily mean to have a miss prone system in strict 450 
sense but might help to reduce issue of alarm fatigue (Welch, 2011). However, for the most 451 
contexts it seems highly doubtful that any developers will design miss prone systems when 452 
they could be held responsible for critical events not indicated by the system. The current 453 
research suggests that the provision of 4-stage LASs constitutes a good compromise here. 454 
They guide human behavior towards a very high compliance, and, thus, do not lead to issues 455 
of cry wolf and alarm fatigue. At the same time, they allow designers to stick to the fail-456 
safe engineering approach. Another solution to circumvent the problems of alarm fatigue 457 
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might be the provision of BASs with adaptable thresholds that leave the threshold setting 458 
with the operator. However, thus far, the effects of such adaptable alarm systems have rarely 459 
been addressed (e.g., Bustamante et al., 2007; Merkel & Wiczorek, 2012) and more attempts 460 
in this direction are eligible. 461 
Key points:  462 
 Behavioral and performance consequences of a conventional binary alarm system 463 
with liberal threshold setting (lib-BAS) were compared with three alternative alarm 464 
systems, i.e., a three- and a four-stage likelihood alarm system (3-LAS; 4-LAS) and 465 
a binary alarm system with conservative threshold setting (con-BAS). 466 
 Compared to the lib-BAS, significant improvements in terms of a reduced cry wolf 467 
effect and an increased joint human machine sensitivity d’ were found for the 4-LAS 468 
and the con-BAS. 469 
 The con-BAS outperformed all other systems with respect to the number of misses. 470 
 Both, 4-LASs and con-BASs provide possible means to counter negative side effects 471 
of conventional lib-BASs in terms of the cry wolf effect and the resulting risk of 472 
missing critical events. 473 
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